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On March 12, 1996, U.S. President William Jefferson
Clinton signed into law the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton)' shortly
after a Cuban MiG-29 fighter jet (MiG) shot down two un-
armed U.S. civilian planes in international airspace in Febru-
ary, 1996.2 All four individuals on board the plane were
killed.3 Helms-Burton derived its name from Senator Jesse
Helms and Representative Dan Burton who co-sponsored the
legislation in February of 1995" in order to strengthen the
economic embargo the United States has maintained against
Cuba since 1959.' President Clinton signed Helms-Burton into
law after the Cuban MiG attack, despite his earlier proclama-
tions that he would veto the bill when it reached his desk.6
1. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104, 114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091).
2. See Fact Sheet: Implementation of the LIBERTAD Act, in 7 U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE DISPATCH 188 (Apr. 8, 1996). See also William J. Clinton, U.S. and the UN
Respond to Cuban Shootdown of Civilian Aircraft, in 7 U.S. DEPT OF STATE DIS-
PATCH 101 (Mar. 11, 1996) (reacting to the incident and discussing unilateral ac-
tions taken).
3. See Ann Devroy, Clinton to Tighten Sanctions on Cuba; Charter Flights
Halted; Legislation Backed, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1996, at Al.
4. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, S.
381, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 927, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (enact-
ed).
5. See 22 U.S.CA. § 6022(2) (West Supp. 1997).
6. See Jefferson Morley, Shoot Down, WASH. POST, May 25, 1997, at W8; see
also Juanita Darling & Craig Turner, Tightened U.S. Sanctions on Trade With
Cuba Begin to Have Impact, L.A. TImES, July 13, 1996, at A8; Thomas W.
Lippman & Douglas Farah, Incident Prompts New Calls for Harder American Line,
WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1996, at A16. U.S. White House officials said that President
Clinton was opposed to Title IlI of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton), which "would allow Cuban Americans
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Helms-Burton maintains economic pressure on the Cuban
government by discouraging foreign investment in Cuban prop-
erties that were confiscated from U.S. nationals.7 Title III of
the act allows U.S. nationals, including Cuban-Americans, to
file lawsuits in U.S. federal courts against foreign investors
who "traffic" in confiscated property located in Cuba.8 Title IV
of the Act requires the exclusion from the United States of
foreign investors participating in the "trafficking."9 The indi-
viduals which can be excluded from the United States under
Title IV include corporate officers, principals, and shareholders
having "a controlling interest of an entity which has been in-
volved in... trafficking in confiscated property.""° Title IV
also excludes these individuals' spouses and minor children."
Helms-Burton gives the President authority to suspend the
effective date of Title III for six months if he determines that
the "suspension is necessary to the national interests of the
United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in
Cuba."' President Clinton has already suspended much of
Helms-Burton. 3 In fact, as recently as January 3, 1997, Pres-
ident Clinton announced that he would suspend the right to
sue under Title Ill for a second six-month period. 4
Despite President Clinton's decisions to suspend most of
and others to sue in U.S. courts for compensation from foreign companies that buy
property that Castro had confiscated over the past three decades." Devroy, supra
note 3; see also 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6081-6085.
7. Congress found that foreign investment in "confiscated property provides
badly needed financial benefit, including hard currency, oil, and productive invest-
ment and expertise, to the current Cuban Government and thus undermines the
foreign policy of the United States." 22 U.S.CA. § 6081(6).
8. Id. §§ 6081-6084.
9. Id. §§ 6023(13), 6091. "Traffics" is defined broadly and encompasses,
among others, individuals who knowingly broker, improve, invest in, or who "be-
gins after March 12, 1996, to manage, lease, possess, use, or hold an interest in
confiscated property." Id. § 6091(b)(2).
10. Id. § 6091(a)(3).
11. Id. § 6091(a)(4).
12. Id. § 6085(b)(1).
13. See Bruce W. Nelan, Taking on the World, TIME, Aug. 26, 1996, at 26, 27.
14. See Peter Morton & John Geddes, Ottawa Spurns Clinton Move: Suspen-
sion of Helms-Burton Lawsuits Dismissed by Eggleton, FIN. POST, Jan. 4, 1997, at
3. Title III was to initially take effect on August 1, 1996, 22 U.S.C.A. § 6085(a),
when President Clinton suspended it until February 1, 1997. On January 3, 1997,
President Clinton announced another suspension of Helms-Burton until July, 1997.
See Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Holds Up Cuba Suits, Pleasing Few, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 6, 1997, at A9.
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Helms-Burton's provisions, as well as the 6,511 lawsuits filed
under Title III of Helms-Burton, 5 Canada, Mexico, and mem-
bers of the European Union (EU) have exhibited resentment
towards the United States for enacting Helms-Burton and for
threatening to enforce it. 6 The impact of Title IV of Helms-
Burton became apparent in Canada when the U.S. Department
of State sent Sherritt International (Sherritt), a Canadian
company investing in a Cuban nickel mine, a notice that its
executives may be denied access into the United States if
Sherritt's investment activities in Cuba were not discontin-
ued.
Two members of the Canadian Parliament expressed their
distaste for Helms-Burton by introducing a bill which would
allow Canadian citizens whose ancestors lost property in the
United States during the American Revolution to file suit."
Canada's international trade minister, Arthur Eggleton, pro-
claimed that Canada would consider taking action against the
United States under the alternative dispute resolution provi-
sions contained in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),' 9 should international discussions regarding Helms-
Burton prove fruitless." Canada also planned to join the EU
15. See Morton & Geddes, supra note 14.
16. See Greenberger, supra note 14. The European Union (EU), in fact, de-
livered a formal protest to the U.S. Department of State. See Nelan, supra note
13, at 27. Even prior to the passage of Helms-Burton, Canada and the EU had
threatened retaliation and lodged diplomatic protests. See Steven Greenhouse,
Allies of U.S. Seek to Block Bill on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, at A9.
17. See Darling & Turner, supra note 6. A State Department spokesperson
stated that two Canadian executives left Sherritt International (Sherritt) "for fear
of American reprisals" under Title IV, although the executives claimed that they
left for other reasons. See Charles Bremner & Martin Fletcher, EU Threatens
Retaliation over Cuba Trade Embargo, TIMES (London), July 13, 1996, available in
1996 WL 6506704. While Title III of Helms-Burton provides that the President
may suspend Title Is lawsuit provision for six months; Title IV does not explicit-
ly authorize the President to suspend its provisions denying visas. See 22 U.S.C.A
§ 6085(b)(1) Instead, Title IV merely provides that the U.S. Secretary of State
"shall deny a visa to, and the Attorney General shall exclude, any alien who the
Secretary of State determines ... traffics in confiscated property" after Helms-
Burton's enactment." Id. § 6091(a). President Clinton has therefore suspended
lawsuits under Title III, while the Secretary of State has issued warnings under
Title IV.
18. See Robert Russo, 2 Canadian MPs Inject Levity into Dour Cuba Bill De-
bate, EDMONTON J., Feb. 12, 1997, at A7.
19. North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., art. 2022, 32 I.L.M. 296, 32 I.L.M. 605, 698 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
20. Eggleton told reporters, "I've still got the NAFTA challenge in my back
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in challenging Helms-Burton before the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO). However, the EU suspended its WTO action2'
after the Clinton administration agreed to seek amendments to
Helms-Burton which would give the President authority to
suspend Title IV.'
Mexico has declared that it will join Canada, its other
NAFTA trading partner, in requesting a dispute resolution
under NAFTA.' Mexico's President, Ernesto Zedillo, has al-
ready met with Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien to
discuss the implications of Helms-Burton on Canadian and
Mexican activities in Cuba.'
This Note will argue that Canada and Mexico, both U.S.
trading partners under NAFTA, stand to win a dispute resolu-
tion proceeding on the issue of whether Helms-Burton violates
NAFTA. Although President Clinton has suspended most of
Helms-Burton's provisions, opponents of the legislation have
argued that the suspensions do not alleviate their distaste for
Helms-Burton, and have expressed the view that a dispute
resolution brought under NAFTA is a viable means for forcing
the United States to dispense with Helms-Burton altogether.25
Helms-Burton clearly violates NAFTA in several respects.
First, Helms-Burton violates Chapter Eleven of NAFTA which
pocket," and that "[ilf things break down and don't proceed, then I can always use
that." Andrew Flynn, Canada Pushes for Green Treaty Deal Sought on Environ-
mental Technology, TORONTO STAR, May 2, 1997, at E2. As one author observed,
"[on June 18, 1996, Canada requested a formal meeting of the [NAFTA Trade]
Commission regarding the Helms-Burton Act. The meeting, a conference call be-
tween the deputy trade ministers of the three NAFTA countries, took place on
June 28, 1996, but did not resolve the dispute." David Lopez, Dispute Resolution
Under NAFTA. Lessons from the Early Experience, 32 TEX. INTI L.J. 163, 171
(1997). On July 29, 1996, Canada and Mexico did become entitled to request the
formation of a Chapter 20 arbitral panel; however, neither country did so as of
December 1996. See id.
21. See United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act,
GATT Doe. WT/DS38/5 (April 25, 1997) (communication from the chairman of the
panel).
22. The World Trade Organization (WTO) action was suspended on April 25,
1997. See Lawrence Herman, Canada Should Sit Tight as Helms-Burton Saga
Unfolds: U.S. and EU May Agree on a Face-Saving Deal, FIN. POST, Apr. 23,
1997, at 17; see also Brittan Berates Canadians, FIN. TINES, May 2, 1997, at 4.
23. See Julia Preston, U.S. Finds Mexico is Adamant on Cuba Trade, N.Y.
TIYES, Aug. 29, 1996, at A5.
24. See The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, July 11,
1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, Macleh File.
25. See Morton & Geddes, supra note 14. Canada in particular has adopted
this position. See id.
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requires that each NAFTA signatory treat investors of other
NAFTA signatories in accordance with the Most Favored Na-
tion (MFN) principle" and international law.27 Helms-Bur-
ton not only works to deny Mexican and Canadian investors
dealing with Cuba entry into the United States, but also pro-
vides that these foreign investors may be sued in federal
courts.'s The U.S. denial of entry to Canadian and Mexican
investors dealing with Cuba, along with the authorization of
U.S. federal courts to hear lawsuits brought against these
investors, operates to undermine the MFN treatment provision
in Chapter Eleven of NAFTA.29 Second, Helms-Burton vio-
lates Chapter Sixteen of NAFTA, under which "[elach party
shall grant temporary entry to business persons" from any of
the signatory nations." Title IV of Helms-Burton, which de-
nies foreign business persons investing in Cuba entry into the
United States, will have the effect of denying access to the
same category of business persons who are guaranteed entry
into the United States under Chapter Sixteen of NAFTA.3"
Finally, the aforementioned provisions of Helms-Burton frus-
trate NAFTA's general objectives by interfering with the free
flow of commerce and trade between Canada, Mexico, and the
United States.
Helms-Burton also violates international law because it is
an unjustified extraterritorial extension of U.S. law, 2 because
it violates the international principle of continuity33 and be-
26. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1103, 32 I.L.M. at 639. The Most Favored
Nation (MFN) principle, as set forth in NAFTA, requires that 'lelach Party shall
accord to ... another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in
like circumstances, to . . . any other Party or ... a non-Party with respect to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or
other disposition of investments." Id
27. See id. art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. at 639-40 (requiring that NAFTA parties "shall
accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with
international law"); see also infra Part V.
28. See 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6082, 6091 (West Supp. 1997).
29. See Kenneth L. Bachman et al., Anti-Cuba Sanctions May Violate NAFTA,
GATT, NATI L.J., Mar. 11, 1996, at C3.
30. Id. art. 1603, 32 I.L.M. at 664-65.
31. See Bachman et al., supra note 29.
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES § 402(1)(c) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. NAFTA reinforces the
obligations of the parties to treat each other in accordance with international law.
NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. at 639-40.
33. See Bachman et al., supra note 29.
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cause it constitutes a secondary boycott. First, Helms-Burton is
an unjustifiable extension of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction
because it lacks a valid basis under international law (i.e., the
effects principle).' Second, Helms-Burton violates the princi-
ple of continuity,35 which requires that private claims to con-
fiscated property be held continuously by nationals of the coun-
try asserting claims to the confiscated property. "Continuously"
refers to a period measured from the time the property is con-
fiscated (the time the claim arises) to the time a claim is es-
poused.36 Helms-Burton violates the principle of continuity
because it allows for the espousal of claims by persons who
were not U.S. nationals at the time the Castro regime confis-
cated their property. Third, Helms-Burton constitutes a sec-
ondary boycott imposed against foreign nationals who deal or
invest in Cuba because it extends United States jurisdiction
beyond U.S. boundaries to restrict the business activities of
foreign nationals." The fact that the United States has long
opposed secondary boycotts undermines the credibility of argu-
ments advanced in favor of the validity of Helms-Burton under
international law. 8
Part II of this Note delineates the history of the U.S. em-
bargo against Cuba. Part III explains Helms-Burton's most
controversial provisions and gives a general discussion of the
jurisdictional bases under international law. Part IV analyzes
the arguments supporting and opposing the proposition that
Helms-Burton violates NAFTA, as well as Canada's and
Mexico's reactions to the enactment of Helms-Burton. Part V
analyzes the arguments in support of and in opposition to the
claim that Helms-Burton violates international law. Finally,
Part VI examines alternatives to the U.S. embargo against
Cuba and argues that the United States, in employing an ex-
treme measure like Helms-Burton, may be paving the way for
an unwanted customary rule of international law.
34. See infra Part V.A..
35. See infra Part V.A.2.
36. See Bachman et al., supra note 29.
37. See infra Part V.A.3.




II. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
The United States has maintained an economic embargo
against Cuba since the early 1960s, following Fidel Castro's
ascent to power. Castro's enactment of confiscatory policies
strained relations between the United States and Cuba. As a
result, the United States began an economic embargo that has
continued for nearly four decades. As one author has pointed
out, "[t]he Embargo on All Trade with Cuba was first imposed
by President Kennedy in February 1962."s9 The authority for
the embargo came from Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1961. 4" This Act provided that no assistance
would be furnished to the Cuban Government, and authorized
the President to establish and maintain a total embargo on all
trade between the United States and Cuba.4' In retaliation to
the embargo, Cuba seized U.S. oil refineries within its borders,
causing the United States to react by amending the Sugar Act
of 1948,2 giving the President authority to establish the Cu-
ban sugar quota.43 In response, the Cuban Government
passed a decree authorizing the expropriation of U.S. owned
property in Cuba."
Congress broadened the embargo further by passing the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations to restrict Cuba's access to
its assets in the United States and to prohibit U.S. citizens
and corporations from conducting business transactions with
Cuba.45 In 1964, Congress amended the International Settle-
ment Act of 1948 to enable U.S. nationals to file claims against
the Cuban government for U.S. property confiscated in
Cuba."
39. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidari-
ty (LIBERTAD) Act, 90 AM. J. IWL L. 419, 420 (1996). The embargo whs issued
under authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195
§ 620(a), 75 Stat. 444 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1) (1994)). See id. at 420.
The initial embargo was not issued pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act
(TWEA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1994), because President Kennedy, at the time,
believed that invoking TWEA soon after the Bay of Pigs incident would be "unnec-
essarily provocative." Lowenfeld, supra, at 420.
40. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1) (1994).
41. Id.
42. 74 Stat. 330 (1961) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994)).
43. See Jonathan R. Ratchik, Cuban Liberty and the Democratic Solidarity Act
of 1995, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLVY 343, 346 (1996).
44. See id.
45. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1963).
46. See Pub. L. No. 88-666, 78 Stat. 1110 (1964) (codified as amended at 22
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In the 1990s, the U.S. attempted to gain foreign coopera-
tion for the embargo by enacting two pieces of extraterritorial
legislation. The first piece of legislation is the Cuban Democra-
cy Act of 1992 (1992 Act) which was signed into law by Presi-
dent George Bush."' The 1992 Act was passed primarily be-
cause of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, once a major fi-
nancial contributor to the Castro government.4" Foreign resis-
tance to the U.S. economic measures against Cuba escalated
because the 1992 Act was viewed as an extraterritorial mea-
sure implemented to tighten the embargo by attempting to
restrict the investment conduct of third party countries in
Cuba.49 First, the 1992 Act purported to restrict the conduct
of third party countries, granting the United States govern-
ment authority to sanction any country that provides any form
of assistance to Cuba, short of food and medical supplies to
nongovernmental organizations or individuals." In addition,
the 1992 Act limited the investment activities of foreign actors
by providing that the U.S. President may issue no licenses to
U.S.C. §§ 1643-1643k (1994)). Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act
of 1948 establishes the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) to obtain
compensation for U.S.. nationals with confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. 22 U.S.C.
§ 1643b. As one author notes, "[t]he Cuban Claims Program of the FCSC was
active between 1966 and 1972" and certified claims totaling $1.8 billion. Cuba has
not compensated any of the claimants to date. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative
Remedies In a Negotiated Settlement of the U.S. Nationals' Expropriation Claims
Against Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 659, 662, 664 (1996).
47. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1994). See, Trevor R. Jefferies, The Cuban Democ-
racy Act of 1992: A Rotten Carrot and a Broken Stick?, 16 HOUS. J. INTL L. 75,
81-82 (1993).
48. See id. at 80. As Jefferies observed, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
(1992 Act) recognized the "crumbling of the Iron Curtain" as "a unique opportunity
for a 'peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.'" Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 6001(6) (West Supp. 1997)).
49. See MICHAEL KRINSKY & DAVID GOLOVE, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEA-
SUES AGAINST CUBA 197-201 (1993). The 1992 Act is unacceptable under interna-
tional law because of its extraterritorial aspects in that it seeks to regulate foreign
companies, not of U.S. nationality, with respect to their conduct outside the Unit-
ed States. See id. at 195, 201.
50. See Jefferies, supra note 47, at 82. More specifically, the 1992 Act provid-
ed that the President may deem any country who provides assistance to Cuba
ineligible for aid under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms Export
Control Act. The 1992 Act also allowed the President to omit any country provid-
ing aid to Cuba from any program for the forgiveness or reduction of debt owed to
the United States. Sanctions against the assisting countries could only be lifted if
the President, with the certification of Congress, determined that democratic prog-
ress was being achieved in Cuba. See id.
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foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms which conduct business in
Cuba.5' As a result, the 1992 Act denied foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. owned companies licenses if those subsidiaries conduct-
ed business in Cuba, even though investing in Cuba may have
been fully legal under the laws of the subsidiaries' country of
origin.
The second attempt by the United States to strengthen its
extraterritorial economic sanctions against Cuba occurred in
March 1996, after a Cuban MiG shot down two airplanes pilot-
ed by Cuban exiles, causing four deaths.52 Immediately follow-
ing the aircraft attack, President Clinton initiated further
controversy amongst U.S. trading partners by signing Helms-
Burton into law, despite his previous indications that he would
veto the bill.5" Helms-Burton is highly controversial within
the international community because it takes the embargo a
step beyond the 1992 Act to penalize all foreign nationals (i.e.,
companies) who invest in Cuba, whether or not the companies
are U.S. owned subsidiaries.
Helms-Burton's explicit purposes are: (i) to strengthen the
economic embargo against Cuba;" (ii) to encourage free and
fair democratic elections in Cuba by developing a plan for
furnishing assistance to a transitional government or a demo-
cratically elected government;5 and (iii) to protect the prop-
erty rights of U.S. citizens in Cuba.55 In order to accomplish
these purposes, Helms-Burton is divided into four major titles.
Title I reaffirms Section 1704(a) of the 1992 Act,5" which
sanctions countries which assist Cuba.58 Title I also opposes
51. See Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 422.
52. See Fact Sheet: Implementation of the LIBERTAD Act, supra note 2, at
188; see also Clinton, supra note 2, at 101.
53. As one journalist noted, "the [Clinton] administration initially opposed the
measure, warning that [Helms-Burton] would strain relations with key allies."
Greenberger, supra note 14; see also Morley, supra note 6; Darling & Turner,
supra note 6; Devroy, supra note 3 (reporting predictions by members of Congress
that Clinton would sign Helms-Burton bill).
54. See 22 U.S.C .A § 6032 (West Supp. 1997).
55. See id. § 6062.
56. See id. § 6082. For an overview of Helms-Burton's provisions prior to
enactment see Ratchik, supra note 43, at 349-51.
57. See id. § 6003(b)(1).
58. See id § 6032(a)(1). Helms-Burton originally contained a provision that
prohibited the importation of sugars, syrups and molasses from countries that
purchase such goods from Cuba. H.R. 927, 104th Cong. This provision was dropped
from the final version of the House bill. See Ratchik, supra note 43, at 349 n.47.
1997]
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Cuba's membership in international financial institutions and
reduces U.S. payments to such institutions that provide loans
or other assistance to Cuba.59
Title II provides for the United States to assist a free and
independent Cuba at such times as the President determines
that a transition, or a democratically elected, government is in
place in Cuba before the United States begins to lift the em-
bargo." Once the President determines that a transition or
democratically elected government exists in Cuba, he is to
consult with Congress and, upon congressional approval, is
authorized "to take steps to suspend the economic embargo of
Cuba."6'
Title HI, the first of the two most controversial provisions
of Helms-Burton, seeks to protect U.S. property rights in Cuba
by penalizing any country or its nationals for investing in
confiscated U.S. property in Cuba.62 The provision allows only
U.S. nationals who own confiscated property in Cuba to sue
any foreign nationals who traffic in such property."
Helms-Burton's broad definition of "trafficking," not only
includes the "selling, transferring, buying, or leasing" of the
confiscated property, but also includes the engagement in any
commercial activity, using or otherwise benefitting from the
confiscated U.S. property in Cuba." For example, Sherritt, a
Canadian mining company which took over the management of
the Moa nickel mine in Cuba (previously owned by U.S. na-
tionals prior to confiscation), would constitute a "trafficker" of
U.S. property under Helms-Burton. As one author pointed out,
"[ilt follows that any person that deals with an enterprise that
existed prior to January 1, 1959 (by whatever name), or with
an enterprise that could be regarded as a successor to such an
enterprise, stands exposed to litigation in the United States, if
it does business or otherwise can be found in the United States.'
59. See 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6034(a), (b).
60. 22 U.S.C-.A § 6062(a).
61. Id. § 6064(a).
62. See id § 6082(a)(1) (making civil remedies available to U.S. nationals
whose property was confiscated by the Cuban government).
63. See id.
64. See id. § 6023(13) (defining "traffics" in broad terms to include any per-
sons who knowingly and intentionally "purchases, leases, receives, possesses, ob-
tains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in con-
fiscated property"). The breadth of this definition suggests that even investors who
lose money investing in Cuba will be liable.
65. Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 428. The first case filed in the United States
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Title IV, the second controversial provision of Helms-Bur-
ton, provides the "teeth" for Title Ill by further penalizing
foreign investors who trade with Cuba by denying visas to
these investors, as well as their spouses and dependent chil-
dren.66 Title IV authorizes the U.S. Secretary of State to de-
termine which foreign investors will be denied entry under
Title IV, regardless of whether these investors are being sued
under Title III.
Helms-Burton also tightens the embargo a step beyond the
1992 Act by limiting the President's discretion to take mea-
sures that either enforce or suspend the embargo, requiring
the President to consult with Congress before any action is
taken with regard to the embargo.67 Section 6064 of Helms-
Burton authorizes the President to suspend the embargo only
upon submitting a determination to Congress that a transition
government is in power.68 Despite all the measures the Unit-
ed States has taken to rid Cuba of the Castro regime, the Cu-
ban government remains intact and continues to deny its popu-
lation the most fundamental human rights; this suggests that
the embargo has been ineffective in weakening Fidel Castro's
power.
69
Ill. HELMS-BURTON'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL PROVISIONS
Title III is the first of Helms-Burton's controversial provi-
sions because it is an unjustified extraterritorial extension of
U.S. laws to foreign countries. Title Ill is unjustified because it
allows the United States to enforce the embargo abroad by re-
pursuant to Title III is a claim brought by Consolidated Development Corporation
of Miami against Sherritt, a corporation based in Toronto, Canada. The Miami
corporation is claiming damages exceeding $1,000,000. The claim is based on prof-
its Sherritt allegedly is realizing from investing in energy assets expropriated by
Castro's regime. See Canadian Measures to Combat Helms-Burton Act Focus on
Protecting Canadian Companies Faced with U.S. Court Claims, N. AM. FREE
TRADE & INVESTMENT REP., July 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10175547 at *5
[hereinafter Canadian Measures].
66. See 22 U.S.CA. § 6091(a).
67. See id. § 6064(a).
68. Id. As one commentator explains, a transitional government is one without
Castro or his brother. See Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 422.
69. See Ratchik, supra note 43, at 348 (1996). A discussion of human rights
violations in Cuba is beyond the scope of this paper. For a detailed discussion see
Thomas David Jones, A Human Rights Tragedy: The Cuban and Haitian Refugee
Crises Revisited, 9 GEO. ILMIGR. L.J. 479 (1995).
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stricting the conduct of foreign nationals without any valid
jurisdictional basis recognized under international law. The
United States recognizes five bases for valid jurisdiction under
international law: i) territoriality; (ii) nationality; (iii) the
protective principle; (iv) the passive personality principle; and
(v) effects principle.70 The effects principle is the only basis for
jurisdiction which the United States can legitimately adopt in
upholding Helms-Burton's legality under international law.
The effects principle would allow the United States to pass
legislation that would restrict foreign conduct, provided that
the foreign conduct has, or is intended to have, a substantial
effect within the United States.7' The United States can valid-
ly impose liability on foreigners acting consistently with their
own countries' laws, provided that the United States can dem-
onstrate a substantial effect. As will be discussed in Part V of
this Note, the United States will be unsuccessful in arguing a
substantial effect in order to support the validity of Helms-
Burton because foreign investments in Cuba do not have a
substantial effect in the United States.72
Title III gives "any person" who "traffics in property which
was confiscated" a three-month grace period to discontinue
their conduct before they become "liable to any United States
national who owns the claim to such property."73 If the "traf-
ficking" continues after the grace period has elapsed, the viola-
tors risk treble money damages providing liability is deter-
mined under the Title.74 As a result, this provision is a sub-
stantial deterrent to investors seeking to invest in U.S. proper-
ty abroad.75
To bolster Title III, Helms-Burton's framers also added
provisions in Title IV to exclude the spouses and dependent
children of these business persons.76 As a result, Title IV
could very well have the incredulous result of stopping "Ms.
Jones, the daughter of a corporate executive from Toronto,...
70. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 402 and accompanying comments.
71. See id. § 402(1)(c).
72. See discussion infra Part V.A.1.
73. 22 U.S.C-.A § 6082(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
74. See id. § 6082(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(C). See also Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 429
& n.53 (noting the lack of clarity in Helms-Burton's treble damages provisions).
75. See Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 429 n.53 (1996) (concluding that the "in
terrorem effecf of Helms-Burton's treble damages provisions "is substantial").
76. See 22 U.S.CA. § 6091(a)(4).
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at the border when she returns from her summer vacation for
her junior year at Vassar.... ." Title IV is also an extrater-
ritorial extension of U.S. laws unjustified by the effects princi-
ple because trafficking of U.S. property in Cuba does not have
a substantial effect within the United States.7"
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST HELMS-BURTON VIOLATING
NAFTA
Canada and Mexico may successfully argue that Helms-
Burton violates Chapters Eleven and Sixteen of NAFTA, as
well as its general objectives. However, the United States may
also find counter-arguments in Chapters Eleven, Sixteen and
Twenty-One of NAFTA. Part IV.A will discuss the counterac-
tive measures Canada and Mexico have taken in their at-
tempts to retaliate against Helms-Burton. Part IV.B will argue
that Canada and Mexico have strong arguments that Helms-
Burton is violative of NAFTA.
First, Title IV of Helms-Burton, which restricts business
persons entry into the United States, violates Chapter Eleven
of NAFTA, which requires that NAFTA countries accord each
other MFN treatment.7" Second, Title IV also offends Chapter
Sixteen of NAFTA which specifically requires that each
NAFTA party provide for the temporary entry of other NAFTA
party business persons. 0 For example, the United States, a
NAFTA party, is obliged to provide for the temporary entry of
Canadian and Mexican business persons. Title IV of Helms-
Burton freely permits the United States to violate Chapter
Sixteen by denying visas to NAFTA party business persons,
even though these same business persons would otherwise be
entitled to visas pursuant to Chapter Sixteen.
Lastly, Helms-Burton is violative of NAFTA's general
objectives which seek to promote the free flow of trade and
commerce among the NAFTA countries.81 Helms-Burton's ex-
clusion of NAFTA business persons, as well as the allowance of
lawsuits to be brought against NAFTA business persons, will
77. See Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 429.
78. See discussion infra Part V.A..
79. See NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1103, 32 I.L.M. 639.
80. See id. art. 1603(1), 32 I.L.M. 664.
81. See id. art. 102, 32 I.L.M. 297.
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hinder the free flow of trade and commerce among the NAFTA
countries.
Part IV.C will examine potential U.S. counter-arguments
to allegations that Helms-Burton is violative of NAFTA and
analyze the strength of these counter-arguments. First, the
United States may argue that Article 1110 of Chapter Eleven
allows for a NAFTA country to prohibit other NAFTA countries
from taking measures that directly or indirectly expropriate (or
are tantamount to an expropriation of) an investment of a
NAFTA country. 2 Thus, the United States may argue that
Helms-Burton explicitly seeks to prevent Canada and Mexico
from taking actions that are direct or indirect expropriations,
or are tantamount to expropriations, of U.S. property in Cuba.
Second, the United States may argue that Article 1111 of
Chapter Eleven permits the adoption of measures which pre-
scribe special formalities in connection with the establishment
of investments of Canadian and Mexican investors.' Thus,
the United States may assert that Helms-Burton is a special
formality prescribed by NAFTA which requires Canadian and
Mexican investors to refrain from establishing and maintaining
investments in Cuba.
Third, the United States may argue that Article 1113 of
NAFTA allows it to deny Chapter Eleven benefits to Canadian
and Mexican investors when their investments are owned or
controlled by investors of a non-NAFTA country with which
the United States maintains no diplomatic relations, or against
which it maintains economic sanctions.' The United States
maintains no diplomatic relations with Cuba and also main-
tains economic sanctions against that nation. Therefore, the
United States may refuse to grant Canadian and Mexican
investors (including their investments in Cuba) Chapter Elev-
en benefits because, even though the investments originate
from Canada or Mexico, they thrive in Cuba and are thus sub-
ject to Cuban control.
Finally, the United States may assert that Article 2102 of
Chapter Twenty-One allows it to take measures inconsistent
with NAFTA during an international relations emergency
when the United States deems such measures necessary for
82. See id. art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. 641-42.
83. See id. art. 1111, 32 I.L.M. 642.
84. See id. art. 1113, 32 I.L.M. 642.
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the protection of its national security interests.' As a result,
the United States can argue that Helms-Burton, although
inconsistent with some of NAFTA's provisions, is a measure
the United States enacted in response to an international rela-
tions emergency (i.e., the MiG's destruction of a civilian plane)
which the United States deems necessary for the protection of
its security interests.
A. Canada's and Mexico's General Opposition to Helms-
Burton
As one journalist pointed out, "Canada and Mexico are two
of the countries most likely to be affected by Helms-Burton."'
Canadian companies based in Cuba have been among the most
active foreign investors in that country. By 1996, these compa-
nies have invested more than $250 million. 7 Consequently,
Canada is a major opponent of Helms-Burton.' Canadian In-
ternational Trade Minister Arthur Eggleton vehemently ex-
pressed his disapproval of Helms-Burton noting that "[i]f the
U.S. government has an argument with the Cuban government
over appropriated or confiscated or seized or stolen proper-
ty... that's an argument with Cuba, not an argument with
Canada or any other country."9 Mexico also has formally spo-
ken out against Helms-Burton. Claude Heller, Mexico's ambas-
sador to Cuba, commented in an interview that "Mexico will
maintain trade relations with the countries that Mexico de-
cides. It is not willing to submit to third countries."'
In addition to publicly denouncing Helms-Burton, Canada
has taken legislative measures to counteract the U.S. policy.
One recent Canadian counteractive measure has been the
introduction of legislation to amend Canada's Foreign Extra-
territorial Measures Act (FEMA).91 FEMA, first enacted in
1985, is a Canadian measure designed to protect Canadian
85. See id. art. 2102, 32 I.L.M. 699-700.
86. Darling & Turner, supra note 6.
87. See Bernard Simon, Canada to Hit Back in Cuba Row, FIN. TIMES, June
13, 1996, at 4 (noting that most of Canada's investments in Cuba are from min-
ing, tourism and energy sectors).
88. See Jill J. Spitz, Canada's Threat Draws Discussion, ORL. SENT., Aug. 19,
1996, at 5.
89. Darling & Turner, supra note 6 (alteration in original).
90. Id.
91. See Canadian Measures, supra-note 65.
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interests from extraterritorial measures like Helms-Burton. 2
In doing so, FEMA authorizes Canada's Attorney General to
"forbid compliance in Canada with extraterritorial measures
that, in his view, infringe upon Canadian sovereignty."93 Can-
ada amended FEMA, effective January 1, 1997, to authorize its
Attorney General to forbid compliance with Helms-Burton, an
extraterritorial measure. 4
In addition to amending FEMA, the Canadian Government
has vowed to enact legislation permitting Canadian companies
sued by U.S. nationals under Helms-Burton to counter-sue in
Canadian courts in order to recover any damages awarded to
U.S. nationals.95 The international aid organization, Oxfam
Canada, has also become a participant in Canada's movement
against Helms-Burton by urging Canadians to boycott Florida
and other U.S. vacation destinations.96 Canada contends that
such a boycott may have worked already, as Florida noted a
seven percent decline in visitations from Canada, while Cuba
reported an increase in Canadian visitors in 1996."7
Mexico is joining Canada's opposition efforts against
Helms-Burton by preparing an "antidote" law to counter the
ramifications of Helms-Burton." Ernesto Zedillo, Mexico's
President, met with Canadian officials to express his country's
disapproval of the U.S. measures, and noted that Mexico's
Congress plans to counteract the effects of Helms-Burton.99
Opposition to Helms-Burton by Canada and Mexico, two major
U.S. trading partners, has thus been strong. °0
92. See id. Canada also implemented Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
(FEMA) to oppose the 1992 Act which Canada, as well as other U.S. trading part-
ners, deem an extraterritorial extension of U.S. authority. See KRINSKY & GOLOVE,
supra note 49, at 197-198.
93. Canadian Measures, supra note 65.
94. See Helms.Burton Action Leaves Envoy Unhappy, VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 6,
1997, available in 1997 WL 6097440.
95. See Tyler Marshall, Europe Plans to Retaliate for U.S. Law on Cuba
Trade Commerce, LA TIMES, July 16, 1996, at A4.
96. See id.
97. See Spitz, supra note 88, at 5.
98. Philip True, Mexico, Canada Vow to Fight Helms-Burton, SAN ANT. EXP.-





B. Arguments Available to Canada and Mexico that Helms-
Burton Violates NAFTA
The proposed means for Canada and Mexico to legally
challenge the validity of Helms-Burton under NAFTA is by a
dispute-resolution panel convened under the agreement. 1
Canada and Mexico have already sought consultations under
NAFTA.'0 2 The Helms-Burton dispute may be referred to the
NAFTA Commission and subsequently to a dispute settlement
panel if the talks among the NAFTA signatories fail.0 3 If a
dispute settlement panel is convened, Canada and Mexico will
have strong arguments that Helms-Burton's provisions, specifi-
cally Titles III and IV, violate U.S. obligations under NAFTA.
1. Arguments That Helms-Burton Violates NAFTA:
Chapter Eleven
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA sets out each NAFTA party's
obligation with respect to investors from other NAFTA coun-
tries and their investments within its territory.'4 Article
1102 of NAFTA expressly states that each NAFTA country is
to "accord to the investors of another [NAFTA country] treat-
ment no less favorable than it accords, in like circumstances,
to its own investors with respect to... disposition of invest-
ments."0 5 This national treatment provision of Article 1102
means that the United States cannot grant investors and in-
vestments of Canada or Mexico' less favorable treatment
than the United States accords to its own investors and invest-
ments.' O7 Article 1104 further illustrates Chapter Eleven's
101. See Darling & Turner, supra note 6.
102. See Richard W. Stevenson, Canada, Backed By Mexico, Protests U.S. on
Cuba Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1996, at A7.
103. See Simon, supra note 87.
104. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Statement
of Administrative Action (1993), reprinted in H.R. DOC. No. 103-159, at 589 [here-
inafter NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action].
105. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1102, 32 I.L.M. 639. "Investment" is broadly
defined in Article 1139 as all existing and future investments. See NAFTA State-
ment of Administrative Action, supra note 104, at 589.
106. "Investor of a party" [i.e., NAFTA country investor] encompasses "both
firms (including branches) established in a NAFTA country, without distinction as
to nationality of ownership, and NAFTA country nationals." See NAFTA Statement
of Administrative Action, supra note 104, at 589.
107. See id. Chapter 11 also requires that NAFTA country governments treat
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general purpose by specifying that NAFTA investors and their
investments are to be accorded the better of national or MFN
treatment.0 " This means that if the United States enters into
a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with France, thereby pro-
viding for a more favorable set of restrictions than would apply
under NAFTA, the United States would then be required to
apply the more favorable rules under the BIT with France to
investors from Canada and Mexico. Additionally, Article
1105 provides for treatment in accordance with international
law and this provision becomes crucial when arguing that
Helms-Burton violates principles of international law, particu-
larly by its extraterritorial application."'
Title IV of Helms-Burton which denies foreign investors
dealing in Cuba entry into the United States, defeats Chapter
Eleven MFN provisions. The U.S. enforcement of the Title IV
penalty for investing in Cuba may allow the United States to
refuse to treat investors from Canada and Mexico as it treats
foreign investors who do not invest in Cuba. The U.S. Depart-
ment of State has already issued a warning to executives of
Sherritt, a Canadian company investing in Cuba, that they will
be denied access into the United States pursuant to Title IV of
Helms-Burton because they are involved in investment activi-
ties in Cuba."' By denying Canadian investors like Sherritt
access into the United States, Title IV allows the United
States to take action contrary to Chapter Eleven's prescrip-
tions.
Canada and Mexico's arguments that Title IV of Helms-
Burton violates NAFTA's MFN provision are problematic be-
cause Title IV purports to accord less than MFN treatment to
any country (whether a NAFTA signatory or not) that invests
in Cuba. Thus, the United States may argue that Helms-Bur-
ton's national treatment and MFN provisions are consistent
with Chapter Eleven because the United States is treating all
foreign investors consistently with the way it treats its own
NAFTA investors and investments no less favorably than investors of other coun-
tries and their investments. See id.
108. See id. at 590.
109. See JON R. JOHNSON, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A COM-
PREHENSIVE GUIDE 286 (1994).
110. For arguments that Helms-Burton violates international law see discussion
infra Part V.
111. See Simon, supra note 87.
[Vol. XXIII:2620
HELMS-BURTON CONTROVERSY
investors who deal with Cuba (all U.S. trade with Cuba is
expressly prohibited). This argument will be problematic, how-
ever, because it raises the question of whether entities and
individuals that invest in Cuba can comprise a distinguishing
category covered by NAFTA's MFN provision.
The problems inherent with the Chapter Eleven argument
may be overcome by the claim that Canadian and Mexican
investors should be accorded MFN treatment by the United
States simply because they are NAFTA investors, and not
because they do or do not engage in investment activities with
non-NAFTA countries (i.e., Cuba). For example, a Canadian
company's investors (i.e., executives) should be accorded MFN
treatment regardless of their non-NAFTA investments. Thus, if
a Canadian national with Cuban investments seeks to enter
the United States in order to participate in further investment
activities, Title IV of Helms-Burton should not operate to ex-
clude them from the United States.
Furthermore, Article 1108(4) states that "no party may,
under any measure adopted after [NAFTA] ... require an
investor of another party by reason of its nationality, to...
dispose of an investment existing at the time [and after] the
measure becomes effective."" Helms-Burton is a measure
adopted by the United States after NAFTA came into effect
which requires all foreign investors, especially Canada and
Mexico, to "dispose" of investments existing at the time Helms-
Burton became effective."' Although Helms-Burton does not
directly require the disposal of investments, it does indirectly
force investors to give up their investments in order to avoid
financial repercussions." Therefore, Canada and Mexico
may argue that Helms-Burton violates this particular provi-
sion. The United States, however, may counter-argue that the
clause "by reason of its nationality" in Article 1108(4) means
that the measure adopted would have to require a party's dis-
posal of its investment because of the party's own nationality.
112. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1108(4), 32 I.L.M. 641.
113. Helms-Burton was signed into law on March 12, 1996. See Fact Sheet:
Implementation of the LIBERTAD Act, supra note 2, at 188; see also Clinton, su-
pra note 2, at 2.
114. See Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 427. The real objective of Helms-Burton
is to deter the behavior of persons or companies in third countries who have in-
vestments in Cuba, or who are seeking to invest in Cuba. See id.
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Because Helms-Burton is not an act that discriminates among
NAFTA party investors due to their nationality, but an act
seeking foreign cooperation with the embargo, it does not vio-
late Article 1108(4).
2. Chapter Sixteen
Chapter Sixteen deals with the temporary travel of
NAFTA "business persons" from one NAFTA country to anoth-
er.115 Article 1608 of Chapter Sixteen defines a "business per-
son as "a citizen of a [NAFTA] Party who is engaged in trade
in goods, the provision of services or the conduct of investment
activities.""6 Chapter Sixteen's provisions are intended to
promote NAFTA's objectives of liberalizing investment laws
and reducing barriers to trade in goods and services by facili-
tating business travel among the NAFTA countries." 7 The
temporary entry provisions of Chapter Sixteen prevent the
frustration of NAFTA objectives which may occur through a
denial of entry to business persons traveling to other NAFTA
countries in order to participate in trade or investment activi-
ties there."' Prior to NAFTA, the United States, Canada and
Mexico maintained their own immigration laws regarding the
temporary entry of persons seeking to engage in commercial
activities."' According to U.S. pre-NAFTA immigration laws,
persons seeking temporary entry to conduct commercial activi-
ty were considered non-immigrants and were subject to various
requirements and restrictions respecting their entry. 2 '
NAFTA purports to promote the temporary entry of business
persons by prohibiting pre-NAFTA requirements like employ-
ment validation or labor certification for all categories of "busi-
ness persons" covered by NAFTA.'2
In order for Chapter Sixteen's temporary entry provisions
115. See generally, NAFTA, supra note 19, arts. 1601-1608, 32 I.L.M. 664-65.
116. Id. art. 1608, 32 I.L.M. 665.
117. See JOHNSON, supra note 109, at 412.
118. See id; see also NAFTA, supra note 19, arts. 1601 & 1602, 32 LL.M. 664.
These articles expressly recognize the desirability of facilitating the temporary
entry of NAFTA party business persons, and that all measures governing the
temporary entry will be enforced to avoid undue influence with trade and invest-
ment activities under NAFTA. See JOHNSON, supra note 109, at 419.
119. See JOHNSON, supra note 109, at 413.
120. See id. at 415.
121. Id. at 419.
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to apply to NAFTA business persons, the business persons
seeking temporary entry must fall into one of four categories
provided for in Article 1603 and Annex 1603. The categories
are: i) business visitors; (ii) professionals; (iii) traders and
investors; and (iv) intra-company transferees.m Chapter Six-
teen provides entry requirements that are common to all four
categories. The first requirement is that no prior approval or
numerical restrictions can be imposed by a NAFTA country
against business persons of another NAFTA country.' For
example, the United States cannot require a petition approved
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service prior to admit-
ting a Canadian or Mexican business person under NAFTA.
Second, a NAFTA country may impose a requirement that a
NAFTA business person seeking temporary entry must first
obtain a visa.' For example, the United States may require
a Canadian or Mexican business person to obtain a visa before
entering the United States. Finally, NAFTA business persons
seeking entry into a host NAFTA country must comply with its
existing immigration measures for temporary entry, except as
modified by NAFTA Chapter Sixteen.' "Existing" immigra-
tion measures are those immigration laws existing between the
United States, Canada and Mexico as of January 1, 1994,
when NAFTA entered into force. 6 Therefore, a business per-
son from Canada or Mexico seeking entry into the United
States pursuant to Chapter Sixteen is required to comply with
U.S. immigration procedures set forth as of January 1, 1994.
Chapter Sixteen also provides that a NAFTA country may
modify its immigration laws to fit within NAFTA's provi-
sions.' As a result, a NAFTA country's immigration policy
existing prior to January, 1994 may have become inapplicable
after January 1, 1994 when Chapter Sixteen became effective.
The United States has modified its immigration policy with
122. See id.; see also Nafta Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 104,
at 625.
123. See JOHNSON, supra note 109, at 420.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 419; see also NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1608 & Annex 1608.
127. See Nafta Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 104, at 626
(observing that Chapter 16 and the Immigration and Nationality Act are consistent
and discussing "limited technical changes ... needed to provide for the admission
of traders and investors and professionals").
1997] 623
BROOK. J. IN2VL L.
respect to temporary entry of non-immigrants in order to im-
plement Chapter Sixteen as part of NAFTA's implementing
legislation." This Note discusses only the modification to the
U.S. immigration law which makes dependant children and
spouses accompanying non-resident NAFTA business persons
into the United States eligible for entry under Chapter Six-
teen, provided they are otherwise eligible for visas. 9
Title IV of Helms-Burton provides for the "[e]xclusion from
the United States of aliens who have confiscated property of
United States [niationals or who traffic in such property."3
In other words, Title IV seeks to exclude any foreign national
from the United States if such national is involved in the con-
fiscation of U.S. property in Cuba, or in the "trafficking" of
U.S. property confiscated by the Castro regime. Title IV pro-
vides that the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to any alien
(foreign national) who he determines has "trafficked" in U.S.
property."3 ' The foreign nationals excludable under Title IV
are those who traffic in confiscated property, for which a claim
is owned by a U.S. national. 2 These foreign nationals in-
clude corporate officers, principals, or shareholders with con-
trolling interests in an "entity which has been involved in the
confiscation of property or trafficking in confiscated
property."' Also within the excludable class are the spouses
and minor children of all foreign nationals excludable under
Title IV."4 Under Title IV, for purposes of excluding foreign
nationals from the United States, the term "trafficker" means
anyone who "knowingly and intentionally," among other
things, invests in or otherwise benefits from the confiscated
128. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §3311 (1994)). Section
341 of this act, 19 U.S.C. §3401, reads as follows:
Upon a basis of reciprocity secured by [NAFTA], an alien who is a citi-
zen of Canada or Mexico, and the spouse and children of any such alien
if accompanying or following to join such alien, may, if otherwise eligible
for a visa and if otherwise admissible into the United States under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.), be considered to
be classifiable as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(E) ....
19 U.S.C. § 3401.
129. See id. § 3401(a).
130. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6091 (West Supp. 1997).
131. See id. § 6091(a).
132. See id. § 6091(a)(3).
133. Id. § 6091(a)(3).
134. See id. § 6091(a)(4).
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property.3 5 The term has been given a broad meaning and
generally encompasses any commercial activity from which a
foreign national derives financial gain.
136
Canadian and Mexican companies clearly are involved in
the trafficking of confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. Sherritt,
the Canadian nickel mining company which took over the Moa
nickel mine in Cuba, previously owned by the United
States,137 is also a trafficker under Helms-Burton. As a re-
sult, Sherritt's executives are a class of excludable foreign
nationals under Title IV because they knowingly benefit from
confiscated U.S. property. Title IV has already operated to
allow the U.S. Department of State to warn Sherritt's execu-
tives that they, their spouses, and dependent children will be
denied visas to enter the United States.3 ' The U.S. Depart-
ment of State has also warned Mexican companies like Grupo
Domos-a Mexico-based telephone company-that their execu-
tives and their executives' families are excludable under Title
IV, based on the determination that these companies were
knowingly benefitting from U.S. property that was confiscated
by Cuba.1
39
Title IV of Helms-Burton violates Chapter Sixteen's tempo-
rary entry of business persons provision because it has the
effect of excluding foreign nationals who are otherwise admis-
sible under NAFTA. Executives of Sherritt and Grupo Domos
are business persons for purposes of Chapter Sixteen. As previ-
ously discussed, Chapter Sixteen lists four categories of busi-
135. Id. § 401(b)(2).
136. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
137. See Darling & Turner, supra note 6. The Moa nickel plant was one of the
5,911 properties that belonged to the United States and were expropriated immedi-
ately after the Cuban Revolution. The nickel plant was owned by a subsidiary of
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., a New Orleans-based firm. Freeport-McMoRan has never
pursued claims over the Moa mine, though the United States and Cuba have con-
stant bickering over settlement of claims resulting from the Cuban seizures. In
addition to taking over the mine, Sherritt is assisting Cuba in developing modem
oil-recovery techniques in order to increase country's energy efficiency. See id.
138. See id.
139. See U.S. Finds Little Support for Joint Action on Cuba, REUTERS NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 6, 1996. The U.S. State Department warning issued to Grupo
Domos, a Mexican cement company investing in Cuba, to terminate its investment
activities in Cuba, thereby avoiding the possibility of sanctions under Title IV. See
id. Executives of Stet, an Italian telecommunications firm, and BG Group, an
Israeli citrus company, also received U.S. Dept of State warnings. See Morton &
Geddes, supra note 14, at 3.
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ness persons that are to be accorded temporary entry.14 The
first category, which has been described as a catch all category,
includes business visitors.' The business visitor category is
further broken down into those business visitors engaged in
business activities set forth in NAFTA Appendix 1603 A.1, and
those who are not engaged in those business activities.' Ap-
pendix 1603 A.1 lists seven types of business activities that
business visitors under Chapter Sixteen would be involved in,
including: research and design; growth, manufacture and pro-
duction; marketing; sales; distribution; after-sales service; and
general service.' It has been noted that "[a] NAFTA country
may not require that a person falling within the business visi-
tor category, regardless of whether the business activity is
listed, obtain employment authorization."'" Those business
visitors whose activities are not listed in Appendix 1603 A.1
must be granted temporary entry on terms no less favorable
than those immigration measures set out by each NAFTA
country after January 1, 1994.'"
Because the business visitor category of Chapter Sixteen is
a catch-all category, encompassing several types of general
business activities (i.e., manufacture and production), the Ca-
nadian and Mexican executives of Sherritt and Grupo Domos
fall into this general category of business persons listed in
Article 1603. Assuming such business persons meet existing
immigration requirements, then, according to Chapter Sixteen,
these Mexican and Canadian business persons are admissible
into the United States. Title IV of Helms-Burton, however,
may become an obstacle to entry. Chapter Sixteen provides
that an admitting party may exclude NAFTA business persons
seeking entry if the admitting country determines that the
business persons will have an adverse impact on a labor dis-
pute within the admitting country.46 Title IV clearly does not
140. See NAFTA, supra note 19, Annex 1603, 32 I.L.M. 665-670; see also dis-
cussion supra Part IV.B.2.
141. See JOHNSON, supra note 109, at 420. Although there are three other
categories listed in Chapter Sixteen, the catch-all nature of the business visitor
category permits this paper to be limited to considering only that category for
purposes of arguing that Helms-Burton violates NAFTA. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 421.
145. See id.
146. A NAFTA party's exclusion of NAFTA party business persons is permis-
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meet this exception, however, because the ground upon which
it purports to deny entry has nothing to do with labor disputes
in the United States. Rather, business persons are denied
entry under Title VI because they are engaging in business
activities in a non-NAFTA country, namely Cuba. Investing in
Cuba or any other non-NAFTA country is not an expressly
permissible reason under Chapter Sixteen for the exclusion of
NAFTA business persons. 47 As a result, Title VI's exclusion
of Canadian and Mexican business persons otherwise admissi-
ble under NAFTA is violative of the U.S. obligations under
that agreement.
Furthermore, Title IV of Helms-Burton is contrary to the
U.S. immigration policy regarding the temporary entry of busi-
ness persons and their families. Title IV expressly provides for
excluding denied business persons' spouses and children. The
United States modified its immigration laws existing prior to
January 1, 1994 in order to conform to its obligations under
Chapter Sixteen." The modified immigration law expressly
provides that the spouses and dependent children of NAFTA
business persons may be eligible for entry when accompanying
business persons into the United States, provided they are not
otherwise inadmissible." Assuming that the spouses and
minor children of NAFTA business persons excludable under
Title IV are otherwise admissible pursuant to Chapter Sixteen,
Title IV's exclusion not only violates Chapter Sixteen, but also
violates the U.S. immigration laws which were modified to
promote Chapter Sixteen.
3. NAFTA's General Objectives
Finally, Canada and Mexico may argue that Helms-Burton
is violative of NAFTA's general objectives found in Chapter
One of NAFTA. Article 102 of NAFTA sets out the main objec-
tives of the Agreement which are, among others, to "eliminate
barriers to trade" and to "facilitate the cross-border movement
sible under Chapter Sixteen when the business persons seeking entry are deter-
mined by the admitting country to have an adverse impact on a labor dispute
taking place within the admitting country's borders if they are admitted. See
NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1603(2), 32 I.L.M. 666.
147. See generally id. arts. 1601-1608, 32 I.L.M. 664-65.
148. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
149. See 19 U.S.C. § 3401 (1994).
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of goods and services between the territories of the par-
ties."5 ' Title IV's exclusion of non-resident NAFTA business
persons operates to hinder NAFTA's main objectives. If the
U.S. Secretary of State determines that a foreign NAFTA busi-
ness person is profiting from confiscated U.S. property in Cu-
ba, that person along with his or her spouse and dependent
children, may be excluded from the United States. 5' Howev-
er, the same persons excludable pursuant to Title IV may be
otherwise fully admissible under NAFTA. Consequently, Title
IV has the effect of excluding otherwise admissible business
persons from the United States, thereby creating-rather than
eliminating-barriers to trade. In addition, the exclusion of
business persons who are admissible under NAFTA impedes
the movement of goods and services between the territories of
the party states. In effect, Helms-Burton allows the United
States to hinder NAFTA's free trade objectives rather than
promote them.
Another NAFTA objective worth mentioning seeks to "in-
crease substantially investment opportunities in the territories
of the [NAFTA] Parties."'52 Title IV violates this objective be-
cause it has already forced major Canadian and Mexican inves-
tors to discontinue their investments in Cuba in order to avoid
U.S. sanctions. The threat of penalties discourages Canada and
Mexico from substantially increasing their investment oppor-
tunities abroad. Instead, Title IV's penal effect operates to
substantially decrease Canada's and Mexico's investment op-
portunities because Canadian and Mexican business persons
who may have sought entry, or who are considering seeking
entry, into the United States to conduct business may be pro-
hibited by Helms-Burton. On the other hand, the United
States reaps the benefits of NAFTA's free trade objectives
because U.S. business persons may enter Canada and Mexico
to conduct investment activities without fear of sanctions. As a
result, Helms-Burton allows the United States to decrease the
investment opportunities for Canada and Mexico within the
United States, while maintaining its investment opportunities
in Canada and Mexico.
Finally, Helms-Burton violates the NAFTA objective of
150. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 102(1)(a), 32 I.L.M. 297.
151. See 22 U.S.C-.A § 6091(a) (West Supp. 1997).
152. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 102(1)(c), 32 I.L.M. 297.
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seeking to "establish a framework for further trilateral, region-
al and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the
benefits of [NAFTA]." 1'5 Titles III and IV of Helms-Burton
have the effect of denying Canada and Mexico's benefits under
NAFTA in several ways. First, cooperation among NAFTA
countries is not promoted by Helms-Burton, as evidenced by
Canada's and Mexico's strong disagreements with Helms-Bur-
ton." For example, Canadian and Mexican officials have
sent a diplomatic protest to President Clinton urging him to
suspend Helms-Burton altogether.155 In Ottawa, the govern-
ment has even threatened legislation that would allow Canadi-
an companies to counter-sue U.S. companies in Canada in
order to recover damages awarded by U.S. federal courts pur-
suant to Title IHI.' 56 This proposed Canadian legislation is a
scheme designed to retaliate against the operation of Helms-
Burton's Title III, which allows U.S. nationals who hold claims
to confiscated property in Cuba to bring lawsuits against for-
eign investors who are profiting from that property.'57 As a
result, Helms-Burton is not gaining cooperation from Canada
and Mexico to promote the benefits of NAFTA. Rather, rela-
tions among the three NAFTA countries have become strained,
as evidenced by the retaliatory legislation being contemplated
by the Canadian and Mexican governments.
The United States is obliged to uphold NAFTA's objectives
and provisions. As such, a law like Helms-Burton which de-
feats NAFTA objectives may not be enforced by the United
States in accordance with NAFTA. Article 105 of NAFTA sets
forth the obligations of the signatory nations as follows:
"[NAFTA countries] shall ensure that all necessary measures
are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of [NAFTA],
including their observance, except as otherwise provided in
[NAFTA], by state and provincial governments." 8 The Unit-
ed States enacted implementing legislation in order to conform
its obligations under NAFTA."' Section 102 of the U.S. im-
153. Id. art. 102(1)(f).
154. See discussion supra Part V.A.
155. See Darling & Turner, supra note 6.
156. See Marshall, supra note 95.
157. See Marshall, supra note 95.
158. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 105, 32 I.L.M. 297.
159. See Nafta Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 104, at 457.
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plementing statute "establishes the relationship between the
NAFTA and [U.S.] law."60 The statute accomplishes the U.S.
obligations under Article 105 by amending existing federal
statutes otherwise inconsistent with NAFTA, or by creating
new laws.'6' The U.S. implementing legislation demonstrates
its sense of obligation toward compliance with NAFTA's provi-
sions. Helms-Burton, in contrast, defeats the main purpose of
NAFTA: to facilitate trade and investment among party coun-
tries. Therefore, by enacting Helms-Burton, the United States
has taken a step back from its attempts to implement NAFTA
and reneged on its obligations under that agreement.
C. The United States Counter-Arguments
1. Chapter Eleven
The United States may argue that Helms-Burton is consis-
tent with its obligations under NAFTA based on the expropria-
tion and compensation provision in Chapter Eleven, Article
1110, because Canadian and Mexican investment activities in
Cuba amount to an expropriation of U.S. property without pro-
viding appropriate compensation. Article 1110 prohibits
NAFTA parties from:
directly or indirectly nationaliz[ing] or expropriat[ing] an
investment of an investor of another [NAFTA] Party in its
territory or take a measure tantamount to... expropria-
tion,... except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discrim-
inatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law...;
and (d) on payment of compensation .... "
Aside from the listed exceptions, Article 1110's expropriation
and compensation provision prohibits Canada or Mexico from
expropriating, and perhaps profiting from any U.S. investment
without compensation. The United States may argue that Can-
ada and Mexico have violated this provision by expropriating
U.S. property (or investment) in Cuba without providing the
United States with compensation. Article 1110 prohibits a
NAFTA country from expropriating, without compensation,
another NAFTA country's investment(s) located within the
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1110(1)(a)-(d), 32 I.L.M. 641 (emphasis added).
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former's "territory." According to this language, Canada and
Mexico are prohibited from expropriating U.S. investments
located within their own territories." As a result, a U.S. in-
vestment outside Canadian or Mexican territory (i.e., in Cuban
territory) falls outside the Article 1110 expropriation and com-
pensation provision.
The United States may argue that, although Article 1110
makes the territorial location of the expropriated investment a
factor in determining whether expropriation has occurred un-
der NAFTA, the article concludes with a clause prohibiting a
NAFTA country from "tak[ing] a measure tantamount to...
expropriation" of another NAFTA country's investments."
The United States may argue that the clause, "or tak[ing] a
measure tantamount to... expropriation," is an all-encom-
passing provision, applying to both investments expropriated
within a NAFTA party's territory and those expropriated with-
in a non-NAFTA party's territory. Because Article 1110 sug-
gests that its main purpose is to prevent the unlawful expro-
priation of one NAFTA party's investments by other NAFTA
parties," the United States can argue that Helms-Burton is
not violative of Article 1110. Instead, it can be contended that
Helms-Burton promotes Article 1110 by preventing Canada
and Mexico from expropriating, without compensation, U.S.
investments in general, whether located within a NAFTA terri-
tory or not.
The United States may also argue that Article 1111 of
Chapter Eleven permits NAFTA countries, notwithstanding
Article 1102 (requiring the national treatment of NAFTA in-
vestors by NAFTA parties),66 to adopt "a measure which pre-
scribes special formalities in connection with the establishment
of investments by investors of another party."67 The United
States may argue that Helms-Burton is one of the formalities
it has adopted in connection with the establishment of Canadi-
an and Mexican investments. Under this theory, the special
formality required by the United States under Helms-Burton
163. Similarly, Article 1110 prohibits the United States from expropriating
Canadian and Mexican investments located within United States territory.
164. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1110(l), 32 I.L.M. 641.
165. See generally id. art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. 641.
166. See id. art. 1102, 32 I.L.M. 639.
167. Id. art. 1111(1), 32 I.L.M. 642.
1997]
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
would be that the NAFTA parties refrain from establishing in-
vestments in Cuba.
It is unlikely that the special formality argument will
work because Helms-Burton does not fall into the definition of
special formalities under Article 1111. Instead, the special
formalities allowable under Article 1111 have been interpreted
to cover "requirements such as typical state incorporation re-
quirements,"'68 not measures like Helms-Burton, which seek
to gain multilateral support for unilateral embargoes. As a
result, it is doubtful that the United States will be able to
successfully argue that Helms-Burton constitutes apermissible
special formality under Article 1111.
Furthermore, Article 1111 contains a caveat which prohib-
its a NAFTA country from adopting special formalities regard-
ing the establishment of investments by other NAFTA coun-
tries, when such formalities "materially impair the [Chapter
Eleven] protections afforded by a [NAFTA] party to investors
[and investments] of another [NAFTA] party ..... 169 Even if
the United States could successfully argue that Helms-Burton
is a special formality under NAFTA, Canada and Mexico can
argue the caveat in Article 1111, and contend that Helms-Bur-
ton "materially impair[s] the protections afforded" to them
under Chapter Eleven by according them less than MFN treat-
ment. Additionally, Canada and Mexico have millions of dol-
lars invested in Cuba. If NAFTA did permit the United States
to adopt measures like Helms-Burton with regard to the estab-
lishment of investments by Canada and Mexico, then the
Chapter Eleven protections accorded to NAFTA parties would
be defeated, and Canadian and Mexican investments in Cuba
would be materially impaired.
The strongest argument available to the United States
that Helms-Burton is not violative of NAFTA lies in Article
1113, which provides that:
A [NAFTA] Party may deny the benefits of [Chapter Eleven]
to an investor of another [NAFTA] Party that is an enterprise
168. Nafta Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 104, at 593. Article
1111(1) gives some examples of special formalities, "such as a requirement that
investors be residents of the Party or that investments be legally constituted un-
der the laws or regulations of the Party .... " NAFTA, supra note 19, art.
1111(1), 32 I.L.M. 642.
169. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1111(1), 32 I.L.M. 642 (emphasis added).
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of such Party and to investments of such investor if investors
of a non-Party own or control the enterprise and the denying
[NAFTA] Party: (a) does not maintain diplomatic relations
with the non-Party; or (b) adopts or maintains measures with
respect to the non-Party that prohibits transactions with the
enterprise or that would be violated or circumvented if the
benefits of [Chapter Eleven] were accorded to the enterprise
or its investments. 70
The United States may argue that Article 1113 permits it to
deny Chapter Eleven investment benefits to investors and
investments/enterprises"' of Canada and Mexico when they
are owned or controlled by Cuban investors (Cuba being the
non-Party). According to Article 1113, the United States may
deny investors of Canada and Mexico Chapter Eleven benefits
when either of two conditions exist. First, when the United
States does not maintain diplomatic relations with a non-party
(i.e., Cuba) or, second, when the United States maintains mea-
sures (i.e., the embargo) prohibiting transactions with the non-
party and such measures would be circumvented if Chapter
Eleven benefits were accorded to Canada and Mexico. As a
result, Helms-Burton allows the United States to deny Chapter
Eleven benefits to Canada and Mexico merely because the
United States does not maintain diplomatic relations with
Cuba. Furthermore, the denial of Chapter Eleven benefits
provides the United States with some assurance that the em-
bargo against Cuba will not be circumvented or violated.
An Article 1113 argument may easily be defeated, howev-
er, because that article requires the investors and investments
being denied Chapter Eleven benefits to be owned or controlled
by investors of the non-party. The United States will find it
difficult to argue that Canadian and Mexican investments in
Cuba are owned or controlled by Cuban investors. On the other
hand, Canada and Mexico may successfully argue that Canadi-
an and Mexican enterprises in Cuba are not "own[ed] or con-
trol[led]" by Cuban investors because Canada and Mexico are
free to terminate such enterprises at will. Canada's and
170. Id. art. 1113, 32 I.L.M. 642 (emphasis added).
171. Article 1139 defines enterprise as an investment constituted or organized
under the law of a Party and a branch located within the territory of a Party and
carrying out business activities there. See id. art. 1139, 32 I.L.M. 647.
172. See id. art. 1113 (1)(a)-(b), 32 I.L.M. 642.
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Mexico's freedom to terminate investments in Cuba is evi-
denced by the recent discontinuance of Sherritt's and Grupo
Domos' investment activities in Cuba."' As a result, the
United States may not justify its denial of Chapter Eleven
benefits to Canadian and Mexican investors by relying on
Article 1113.
The success of Canada's and Mexico's argument regarding
Article 1113, however, will depend upon the interpretation of
the terms "own or control" within the article. If maintaining a
business enterprise in Cuba, perhaps in conjunction with a
Cuban investor, is considered to be sufficient to subject an
enterprise to the ownership and control of the Cuban investor,
then the United States may have the stronger argument. How-
ever, as previously discussed, Canada and Mexico may be free
to terminate their investments in Cuba at will as illustrated by
the recent departure of Mexico's Grupo Domos and Canada's
Sherritt.
2. Chapter Twenty-One
The United States may argue that Chapter Twenty-One of
NAFTA allows it to pass legislation which would otherwise be
inconsistent with NAFTA "in order to protect its essential
security interests."'74 Article 2102 states:
[Niothing in [NAFTA] shall be construed... to prevent any
[NAFTA] Party from taking any actions that it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to traffic in arms... ; (ii) taken in time of war or
other emergency in international relations; or (iii) relating to
implementation of national policies and international agree-
ments related to non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons....
During the negotiation of Article 2102, the United States as-
serted that it would invoke the article, if necessary, to prevent
any circumvention of the Cuban sanctions program.' 7 The
173. See discussion supra Part N.B.2.
174. Nafta Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 104, at 666.
175. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 2102(1)(b), 32 I.L.M. 699 (emphasis added).
176. See Nafta Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 104, at 498.
Article 309(3) of NAFTA deals with the United States Cuban Sanctions Program
by explicitly permitting the United States to ensure that Cuban products or goods
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United States may argue that Helms-Burton constitutes an
Article 2102 measure taken in time of an emergency in inter-
national relations and is necessary to protect essential U.S.
security interests. After all, Helms-Burton was enacted in re-
sponse to the MiG attack, which can easily be construed as an
emergency in international relations. Thus, Helms-Burton can
be characterized as a necessary measure designed to protect
essential U.S. security interests. Furthermore, the protection of
U.S. property interests abroad is essential to the recognition of
a fundamental right to property guaranteed to all nationals
under the U.S. Constitution. 177
This argument is not viable, however, because Helms-
Burton may not be upheld as a good faith measure taken in
time of an international relations emergency. NAFTA's Article
2102 national security exception "is self-judging in nature,
although each government would expect the provisions to be
applied by the other in good faith."7" "Self-judging in nature"
means that the country acting to promote its national security
interests determines what measures are necessary to achieve
those ends. As a result, the United States is entitled to make
the determination of whether or not Helms-Burton is necessary
for the promotion of U.S. national security interests. This not-
withstanding, Article 2102 is based on the understanding that
the United States, or any NAFTA party, will exercise the self-
judgment authority under Article 2102 in good faith so as to
prevent abuse.7 9 The United States may argue that it made
the determination that Helms-Burton is a necessary measure
for the promotion of its essential security interests during an
international emergency.' However, Canada and Mexico
made from Cuban materials are not imported into the United States via Mexico or
Canada, and that United States products are not exported to Cuba via these coun-
tries. See NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 309(3), 32 I.L.M. 303.
177. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
178. Nafta Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 104, at 666 (empha-
sis added).
179. See id. Each NAFTA government expects the Article 2102 exception to be
exercised in good faith. Id. The language of Article 2102 is similar to GATT Arti-
cle XXI and has been criticized as being "so broad, self-judging and ambiguous
that it obviously can't be abused." JOHNSON, supra note 109, at 474-475 (1994); see
also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 203-06 (4th prtg. 1991) (ar-
guing that because of the danger of abuse GATT parties have been reluctant to
invoke GATT Article XXI).
180. In fact, the United States had argued, in response to the EU's complaint
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may argue that the United States has not exercised its judg-
ment in good faith and has thus violated the international
customary principle of pacta sunt servanda which requires the
United States to exercise its treaty rights and obligations un-
der NAFTA in good faith. 8'
The United States has not exercised its discretion under
Article 2102 in good faith. Helms-Burton's protection of U.S.
economic interests in Cuba does not have any national security
goals with respect to the Cuban MiG attack. Although Article
2102 permits a NAFTA party to take good faith emergency
measures otherwise inconsistent with NAFTA in order to pro-
tect its essential security interests, the connection between the
MiG attack and Helms-Burton's protection of U.S. property
rights abroad is untenable. If the United States had enacted
Helms-Burton in good faith to respond to an international
relations emergency, then President Clinton would not have
consistently suspended Helms-Burton's provisions since its
enactment. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the absence of
Helms-Burton would have exposed the United States to a na-
tional security threat from Cuba or any other country. U.S.
property in Cuba was confiscated by the Castro regime nearly
thirty-five years ago. Despite the non-existence of measures
like Helms-Burton prior to 1996, the confiscation of U.S. prop-
erty in Cuba was not considered to be the cause of any nation-
al security threat by the United States.'82 This lends support
to the argument that Helms-Burton is not an attempt to deal
with an international emergency, but an attempt to deter the
before the WTO challenging Helms-Burton, that Helms-Burton is not a matter
regarding trade, but one regarding national security. See William Echikson, Europe
Shows Muscle in this Tussle, BUS. WEEK, May 26, 1997, at 76 E6.
181. According to the customary principle of pacta sunt servanda, set forth in
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "[e]vbry treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, art. 26,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Con-
vention]. See also, BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 44 (2d ed., 1990) (noting that pacta sunt servanda is "one of the most
basic principles of international law").
182. Prior to the United States enactment of Helms-Burton, U.S. nationals with
claims to confiscated property in Cuba had the International Claims Settlement
Act of 1949 available to them in obtaining compensation for their property. See 22
U.S.C. § 1643 (1994). If the confiscation of property was considered to be a nation-
al security threat it is logical that the United States would have enacted legisla-
tion along the lines of Helms-Burton much sooner.
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investment conduct of third countries in Cuba."s Conse-
quently, an argument that Helms-Burton is a measure protect-
ing U.S. security interests would be thoroughly unpersuasive.
V. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST HELMS-BURTON VIOLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Part V.A will discuss the arguments available to Helms-
Burton's opponents with respect to the legislation's illegality
under international law. Helms-Burton's illegality under inter-
national law results in a violation of NAFTA because NAFTA
requires that member countries adhere to international
law." ' Helms-Burton violates international law in a number
of ways.
First, Helms-Burton violates international law because it
is an unjustified extraterritorial application of U.S. law to for-
eign countries. Helms-Burton is considered extraterritorial
legislation because it requires foreign countries and their na-
tionals (i.e., investors) to either comply with the U.S. sanctions
against Cuba or face lawsuits by U.S. nationals and/or revoca-
tion of visas permitting entry into the United States. According
to U.S. foreign relations law (which adopts the jurisdictional
principles of international law), a country may legally enact
laws effecting conduct outside its territory which have, or are
intended to have, a substantial effect within its borders."
Under this principle, which is known as the effects doctrine,
Helms-Burton would be consistent with international law if its
purpose is to alleviate foreign activity which has, or is intend-
ed to have, a substantial effect within U.S. territory.86 Pro-
ponents of Helms-Burton support its extraterritorial applica-
tion by emphasizing the statute's protection of U.S. property
interests.'87 Although, Helms-Burton explicitly purports to
183. See Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 427 (quoting a House Report on the
Helms-Burton bill which asserted that the purpose of Helms-Burton's remedies are
to discourage persons and companies from engaging in commercial transactions
involving confiscated property).
184. Article 1105 of NAFTA provides that each NAFTA country must accord
NAFTA party investors treatment in accordance with international law. See
NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1105(1), 32 I.L.M. 639.
185. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 402(1)(c); see also Ratchik, supra note
43, at 362; Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 431.
186. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 402(c).
187. See, e.g., Ratchik, supra note 43, at 364.
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protect the U.S. property interests," the United States must
demonstrate that Canadian and Mexican investments in Cuba
have a substantial effect within U.S. borders in order to invoke
the effects doctrine. This is a weak argument for justifying the
existence of Helms-Burton because Canadian and Mexican
investments have not had any substantial effect within the
United States. 89
Second, Helms-Burton violates the principle of "continuity"
which requires that a claim to property be continuously owned
from the date the claim arose (property is confiscated), to the
date of the claim's presentation in court (espousal), by nation-
als of the country asserting the claim." Title III of Helms-
Burton effectively allows persons who were Cuban nationals
when their property was confiscated by the Castro government
to assert claims to that property once they become U.S. nation-
als. Continuity is thus defeated because some U.S. nationals
presently espousing claims to property in Cuba were not U.S.
nationals, but Cuban nationals when their property was confis-
cated.
Third, arguments have been made that Helms-Burton may
violate the Act of State Doctrine, a U.S. judge-made principle
not found anywhere within the U.S. Constitution, which pre-
cludes U.S. federal district courts from questioning the validity
of acts of foreign nations.91 This Note will not discuss those
arguments because Congress, in Title III of Helms-Burton,
expressly prohibits U.S. federal courts from invoking the Act of
State Doctrine in order to refrain from deciding disputes in-
volving U.S. nationals challenging the investment activities of
foreign nationals.' As a result, the Act of State Doctrine
188. Helms-Burton states that its main purpose is "to protect the claims of
United States nationals who had property wrongfully confiscated by the Cuban
government." 22 U.S.C.A. § 6081(6)(B).
189. See discussion infra Part V.A.1.
190. See id.
191. See Ratchik, supra note 43, at 365 (warning that "b]udicial announcements
concerning the validity of a foreign government's confiscation of property could
embarrass the other branches in carrying out the nation's foreign policy"). The Act
of State Doctrine is not an exception to the U.S. courts' obligation to decide cases
or controversies, when those cases or controversies may embarrass foreign govern-
ments, but requires that, in the process of deciding, acts of foreign sovereigns
taken within their own jurisdiction be deemed valid. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.
v. Envtl Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
192. See 22 U.S.C. § 6082(6).
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does not apply. Congress acted constitutionally in suspending
the Act of State Doctrine under Helms-Burton, even though
the doctrine is judge-made and has been implemented for
years, because Congress has the authority to "enjoin courts
from using the [Act of State] doctrine as a discretionary mea-
sure."
193
Finally, Helms-Burton constitutes a secondary boycott,
because it restricts foreign nationals from dealing with or in-
vesting in Cuba and is, therefore, contrary to declared U.S.
policy. The boycott maintained by the United States prior to
the enactment of Helms-Burton, which restricted only U.S.
nationals from investing in or dealing with Cuba, is an exam-
ple of a primary boycott. Helms-Burton, in contrast, is a sec-
ondary boycott because it restricts foreign nationals from deal-
ing with or investing in Cuba. The United States has previous-
ly denounced secondary boycotts as being inconsistent with
international law.' This may support an argument that sec-
ondary boycotts such as Helms-Burton violate customary inter-
national law.195 The only way that the United States will be
able to counter such an argument is by claiming that second-
ary boycotts are in fact legal, which would bear the risk of
creating an unwanted principle of customary international law.
Part V.B will examine potential U.S. counter-arguments to
allegations that Helms-Burton violates international law. First,
the United States may argue that Helms-Burton is not in vio-
lation of international law because foreign investments in
Cuba have a substantial effect within the United States. For-
eign investment provides Fidel Castro with the currency he
193. Ratchik, supra note 43, at 366. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 32,
§ 441, especially comment e and reporter's note 4 noting that Congress may enjoin
the courts from applying the Act of State Doctrine. Congress has historically at-
tempted to place strict limitations on the judiciary's application of the doctrine.
See Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REv.
325, 392 (1986). The most important limitation was Congress' enactment of the
Hickenlooper Amendment, a response to the U.S. Supreme Coures Sabbatino deci-
sion, which provided that:
[no U.S. court] . . . shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state
doctrine to make a determination on the merits ... [of] a case in which
a claim of title or other rights to property is asserted by any party...
based upon a confiscation or other taking... by an act of that state in
violation of the principles of international law ....
Id. (quoting the Hickenlooper Amendment 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)).
194. See Bachman et al., supra note 29.
195. See id.
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needs to support his government. A financially equipped Cu-
ban government presents a security threat to the United
States because of the geographic proximity of the two coun-
tries.
Second, the United States may argue that Cuba violated
international law by illegally confiscating U.S. property with-
out providing compensation and by confiscating the property of
Cuban citizens. The United States, on the other hand, is legal-
ly attempting to obtain compensation for confiscated U.S. prop-
erty because entities like the Foreign Claims Settlement Com-
mission (FCSC), designed to obtain compensation, have proven
to be ineffective. The ineffectiveness of the FCSC is shown by
the fact that many of the nationals who have filed claims with
the FCSC have not yet received compensation.
Third, foreign investors are knowingly dealing with confis-
cated property and are thus "taking the risk that... dispos-
sessed owners or aggrieved states might take action against
them."" Investors in confiscated property are taking on ad-
ditional risks because illegal confiscations under international
law do not effectively pass title which the international com-
munity is obliged to recognize. 9 '
A. Arguments that Helms-Burton Violates International Law
1. Effects Doctrine
The effects doctrine provides a weak foundation for the
claim that Helms-Burton is in compliance with international
law because Canadian and Mexican investment practices in
Cuba have no substantial effect within the United States. The
United States recognizes five bases of jurisdiction prescribed
by international law.'98 The five bases are: (i) territoriality;
(ii) nationality; (iii) protective; (iv) passive personality; and (v)
effects doctrine. In examining each basis, it is clear that the
only possible justification for the extraterritorial jurisdiction
asserted by Helms-Burton is under the effects principle.
196. Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent With
International Law, 90 Am. J. Int'l L. 434, 437 (1996).
197. See id.




Territoriality is the most common basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction and entails the notion that countries are free to
regulate and exercise jurisdiction over "conduct that, wholly or
in substantial part, takes place within its territory." 99
Helms-Burton does not fall into this first category of jurisdic-
tional bases because it purports to regulate conduct that takes
place outside the United States in territories such as Canada
and Mexico. Therefore, the United States cannot use the
territoriality doctrine to uphold Helms-Burton's legality under
international law.
b. Nationality
Nationality permits a country to exercise jurisdiction over
"the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory."0 0 This basis is similar to territoriality in that both
bases allow a country to assert jurisdiction over its own nation-
als located within its own territory, and sometimes over its
nationals located abroad. The status of the embargo prior to
Helms-Burton was one implemented in accordance with the
nationality basis since the United States was regulating only
the conduct of U.S. nationals. Helms-Burton, on the other
hand, asserts jurisdiction over the conduct of foreign nationals
by limiting their investment. Therefore, the United States
cannot successfully argue the nationality basis to justify
Helms-Burton's application to foreign nationals.
c. Protective
The protective principle "recognizes the right of a state to
punish a limited class of offenses committed outside its territo-
ry by persons who are not its nationals-offenses directed
against the security of the state or other offenses threatening
the integrity of governmental functions that are generally
recognized as crimes by developed legal systems .... 2 01 The
199. Id. § 402(1)(a). According to comment c, countries have exercised jurisdic-
tion with respect to foreign companies outside their territory on the grounds that
the countries have control over the companies' affiliates present in its own territo-
ry. Id. cmt. c.
200. Id. § 402(1)(b).
201. Id. § 402(3).
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protective principle allows a country to exercise jurisdiction
over foreign nationals who commit offenses against its national
security. Helms-Burton is not a U.S. attempt to exercise juris-
diction over foreign nationals who commit offenses against the
security of the United States. Rather, Helms-Burton targets
foreign nationals because they invest in Cuba. Canadian and
Mexican investment practices in Cuba are not offenses against
the security of the United States because the offenses applica-
ble under the protective principle are those like espionage and
counterfeiting of a country's seal or currency."2 A foreign
national's investment in Cuba, even if it results in substantial
financial gain from confiscated United States property, is not a
criminal offense covered by the protective principle. As a re-
sult, the United States cannot support Helms-Burton's extra-
territoriality using the protective principle.
d. Passive Personality
The passive personality principle "asserts that a state may
apply law-particularly criminal law-to an act committed
outside its territory by a person not its national where the
victim of the act was its national." °' The passive personality
principle enables Country A to exercise jurisdiction outside its
territory in order to punish nationals of Country B, provided
B's national(s) have harmed A's national(s). Helms-Burton
cannot be upheld under the passive personality principle be-
cause the doctrine is primarily applied to criminal offenses and
terrorist activities,204 not investment activities. Furthermore,
the passive personality principle is not a generally favored
basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction, and is limited mainly to
governmental actions taken to combat terrorism.0 5
202. See id. § 402, cmt. f.
203. Id. § 402, cmt. g.
204. See id. § 402, cmt. g.
205. See id. § 402 cmt. g. (noting that the passive personality principle has not
been generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but has been used increasing-
ly with regards to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by
reason of their nationality, or to assassination of a state's diplomatic representa-
tives or other officials). As a result, it is unclear whether passive personality has





The effects principle allows a country to exercise jurisdic-
tion "with respect to activity outside the state, but having or
intending to have a substantial effect within the state's territo-
ry .... 206 The effects principle allows Country A to prescribe
or proscribe activity outside its borders, as long as the activity
has, or is intended to have, a substantial effect within Country
A's territory. Helms-Burton falls squarely within the effects
principle because it purports to regulate activity outside the
United States (i.e., investment activities of Canada and Mexi-
co) which the United States deems to have an effect within its
borders. Although the United States may support the legality
of Helms-Burton by arguing the effects principle, it must first
successfully establish that the activity it wishes to assert juris-
diction over has a substantial effect within the United States.
Mexican and Canadian investment activities in Cuba do
not have a substantial effect within the United States. Prior to
the enactment of Helms-Burton, the United States maintained
an economic embargo against Cuba by restricting only U.S.
nationals from dealing with Cuba.07 Other countries were
free to maintain relations with Cuba, and did so. For thirty-
five years the United States maintained economic relations
with other countries who chose to trade with Cuba."' Sud-
denly, in 1996 the United States decided that other countries
investing in Cuba were having a substantial effect within the
United States. After nearly four decades of maintaining an
206. Id. § 402(1)(c) & cmt. d (emphasis added). Like passive personality, it is
unclear whether the effects doctrine has reached the level of custom so as to sup-
port an economic measure like Helms-Burton. In fact, the effects doctrine has been
a major source of controversy when invoked to support regulation of foreign activi-
ties abroad because of the economic impact of those activities in the regulation
state. See id. § 402, illus. 2.
207. See discussion supra Part H.
208. An excellent illustration of the willingness of the United States to uphold
economic and political relations with countries that choose to trade with Cuba
despite the embargo is NAFTA. Canada and Mexico were dealing with Cuba, and
confiscated U.S. property in Cuba, when both countries negotiated a trade agree-
ment with the United States. Nevertheless, the United States entered a free trade
agreement with Canada and Mexico and merely reserved for itself the right to
ensure that Cuban products or goods made from Cuban materials are not imported
into the U.S. via Mexico or Canada, and that U.S. products are not exported to
Cuba via Mexico or Canada. See Nafta Statement of Administrative Action, supra
note 104, at 498.
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embargo without coercing foreign cooperation, the United
States may not be heard to complain by arguing the effects
principle.
Furthermore, even if foreign investments in confiscated
U.S. property have a substantial effect within the United
States, aggrieved U.S. nationals with ownership claims to
property in Cuba were free, prior to Helms-Burton, to file their
claims with the FCSC as provided for by the International
Claim Settlement Act of 1949."9 U.S. nationals seeking com-
pensation for confiscated property can and have filed claims
with the FCSC.21' Therefore, the United States does not need
Helms-Burton to deal with the return of confiscated U.S. prop-
erty. In fact, Nicholas J. Gutierrez, Jr., an attorney for several
Cuban-American families in Miami and a proponent of Helms-
Burton, stated that Helms-Burton's purpose is not to win law-
suits, but to "drive foreigners out of Cuba."2
Even if the United States is successful in exercising juris-
diction under the effects principle, Section 403(1) of the RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (RESTATEMENT) asserts that even if one of the
five bases for jurisdiction in Section 402 is available, a state
may not exercise its jurisdiction when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable. 2  Thus, Canada and Mexico
may argue that the United States exercise of jurisdiction over
foreign nationals is unreasonable. In order for Canada and
Mexico to propose that Helms-Burton is unreasonable, they
must evaluate the criteria for unreasonableness set forth in
Section 403(2) of the RESTATEMENT. 213 Furthermore, the exis-
209. See 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994).
210. Helms-Burton does explicitly provide a cause of action for all U.S. nation-
als who currently hold unresolved claims property initially certified under the
Claims Act. See generally 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(h)(2).
211. Scarecrow: Cuba and the United States, THE ECON., Apr. 13, 1996, at 36,
36.
212. See Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 431; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note
32, § 403(2) (setting out the criteria for determining reasonableness).
213. Evaluating whether Helms-Burton is unreasonable according to Section 403
of the RESTATEMENT is beyond the scope of this paper. However, Section 403 pro-
vides:
[w]hether the exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unrea-
sonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where
appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state,
i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the territo-
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tence of entities such as the FCSC and the International Court
of Justice to assist U.S. nationals in acquiring compensation
for confiscated property abroad214 makes Title HI of Helms-
Burton appear superfluous.
2. Continuity
Title III of Helms-Burton violates the principle of "continu-
ity"215 because it presently grants U.S. nationals a federal
cause of action to recover compensation for confiscated proper-
ty in Cuba. A cause of action is granted to all U.S. nationals
with claims regardless of whether or not they were U.S. when
their property was confiscated. According to continuity, a claim
for property must be continuously owned from the date the
claim arises to the date the claim is espoused by the nationals
of the state asserting the claim.216 Title III states that U.S.
nationals may bring claims against foreign investors for confis-
cated property.27 However, the category of U.S. nationals
that may sue under Title III includes Cuban-Americans who
ry, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
territory;,
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity between the regulating state and.., those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) character of [regulated activity], the importance [of the regula-
tion], the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and
the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the tradi-
tions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. § 403(2)(a)-(h).
Canada and Mexico may argue that the Helms-Burton does not meet the above
factors and is thus an unreasonable exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction even if
one of the five jurisdictional bases listed in Section 402 is present.
214. See 22 U.S.C. § 1643. The Act sets forth a Foreign Settlement Claims
Commission allowing for U.S. nationals to obtain compensation for confiscated
property.
215. Bachman et al., supra note 29.
216. See id.
217. See 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6081-85.
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became U.S. nationals some time after their property was
confiscated by the Cuban government. The group of claimants
would effectively include a large majority of Cuban immigrants
over the past three-and-a-half decades.1 8 As a result, Title
III violates continuity by endorsing the claims of Cuban-Ameri-
cans who were not U.S. nationals at the time their property
was confiscated.
Furthermore, Helms-Burton's violation of continuity allows
the United States to defeat the alleged purpose of the legisla-
tion: to protect U.S. property interests in Cuba. The United
States asserts that Helms-Burton was enacted to obtain com-
pensation for confiscated U.S. property.219 However, not all of
the property being claimed under Title III is U.S. property.
Some of that property was owned by Cuban exiles who were
not U.S. nationals when the property was confiscated, and who
were not previously allowed to recover compensation under the
FCSC." ° As a result, not all of the property Helms-Burton
purports to protect is U.S. owned.
3. Secondary Boycott
Titles III and IV of Helms-Burton create "private liability
for trafficking in confiscated property [and thus] amount to a
secondary boycott of persons that deal with Cuba.""' An ex-
ample of a primary boycott is embargo the United States main-
tained against Cuba prior to the enactment of Helms-Burton.
That is, a boycott affecting or prohibiting only the conduct of
the U.S. nationals. A secondary boycott, on the other hand, is
one monitoring not only the conduct of the country instituting
the embargo, but also the conduct of other countries regardless
of whether the other countries (non-targets) agree with or seek
to comply with the embargo. Helms-Burton establishes a sec-
ondary embargo because it restricts nationals of countries like
Canada and Mexico from dealing with Cuba (the target of the
United States economic measures), even though Canadian and
Mexican laws do not prohibit its nationals from investing in
218. See Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 424.
219. See 22 U.S.CJ.A § 6081.
220. Cuban exiles were not allowed to sue under the FCSC. See Samuel A.
Giberga, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,
44 LA. B.J. 268, 269 (1996).




The United States maintains a declared policy of opposing
secondary boycotts,' labeling them as "nonenforceable coun-
termeasures" and allowing for their implementation only in
retaliation for a breach of some obligation or duty owed to the
"invoking state" (i.e., United States).2" The United States en-
dorses such a policy because it does not want other countries to
implement secondary boycotts which would penalize U.S. na-
tionals for failure to cooperate with foreign measures the Unit-
ed States does not agree with or seek to endorse.2" Despite
its declared policy, the United States is maintaining a second-
ary boycott through the operation of Helms-Burton.
The secondary boycott, created through Titles III and IV of
Helms-Burton, is not a retaliatory measure implemented as a
result of a breach of duty or obligation foreign countries have
toward the United States. Instead, Helms-Burton's function is
solely to prevent the "trafficking" of confiscated U.S. proper-
ty. 6 Third party countries like Canada and Mexico have
never had a duty or obligation to comply with the U.S. econom-
ic measures against Cuba. By attempting to impose such a
duty through the form of a secondary boycott, the United
States risks the creation of an unwanted principle of custom-
ary international law. This danger is compounded by the fact
that the United States is likely to be faced with an argument
that secondary boycotts are illegal as a matter of international
custom, to which the only response would be that such boycotts
are in fact perfectly valid within the international arena,
B. Arguments that Helms-Burton Does Not Violate
International Law
1. Helms-Burton is Consistent With the Effects Doctrine
The United States may argue that Helms-Burton, al-
though extraterritorial, is consistent with the effects doctrine
because Canadian and Mexican investments in Cuba have a
222. See Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 429-30 (discussing Helms-Burton as a
secondary boycott).
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substantial effect within the United States, and Helms-Burton
is not an unreasonable extraterritorial exercise of U.S. jurisdic-
tion under international law." ' As an example of this sub-
stantial effect, the United States may cite Cuba's proximity to
the United States and the historically uneasy relationship
among the two countries." Cuba's suppression of democracy
and violations of human rights has caused numerous Cuban
refugees to flee to the United States. 9 Recently, Fidel Castro
began constructing two Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors
in the Cuban city of Juragua, just 180 miles off the coast of
Florida and the funding for the project may continue to come
from foreign investors.' 0 These occurrences demonstrate the
substantial effect that foreign investments in Cuba are having
on the domestic; economic, social and political well-being of the
United States.
However, despite U.S. contentions that Helms-Burton is
necessary to prevent Castro from obtaining the financial sup-
port to help keep him in power, it will be difficult for the Unit-
ed States to demonstrate the reasonableness of Helms-Burton
under the effects principle."1 "The effects principle has been
a major source of controversy when invoked to support regula-
tion of activities abroad by foreign nationals because of the
economic impact of those activities in the regulating state.""2
Helms-Burton may be viewed as an economic regulation be-
cause its purpose is to protect property interests. Therefore,
the United States may not readily rely on the effects principle.
In addition, the United States has maintained the embargo for
thirty-five years without resorting to extreme extraterritorial
measures like Helms-Burton. Now that such a measure has
been enacted, President Clinton has virtually nullified it by
suspending most of its provisions. 3 The suspensions strong-
227. See discussion supra Part V.AA.
228. See Brice M. Clagett, supra note 196, at 435.
229. See id. at 436.
230. See Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. & Roger W. Robinson, Jr., Stop the 'Cuban
Chernobyl'" WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1997, at A18. Fidel Castro believes the he can
get the Europeans, Canadians, Latin Americans and Russians to provide financial
support for the Juragua nuclear complex. See id. The nuclear reactors are sub-
standard by Western guidelines and a Cuban nuclear catastrophe could expose as
many as 80 million Americans to radioactivity. See id.
231. See discussion supra Part VA
232. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 403, illus. 2.
233. See Greenberger, supra note 14, at A9.
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ly suggest that the substantial effect of foreign investments in
Cuba are not be as pressing as the United States represents.
2. Cuba is the One Who Violated International Law
The United States may support Helms-Burton as a mea-
sure needed to obtain compensation for illegally confiscated
U.S. property in Cuba.24 The FCSC, designed to help obtain
compensation for confiscated U.S. property, has been unsuc-
cessful in obtaining reparations. 5 Furthermore, the espousal
of claims by "the victims' government can take generations to
bear any fruit at all and, even when it does, typically results in
recovery... of... pathetically inadequate fraction[s]" of com-
pensation. 6 Therefore, Helms-Burton is necessary for com-
pensating U.S. nationals with rightful claims to property in
Cuba the compensation they deserve.
Helms-Burton, however, may not necessarily be more
effective in obtaining compensation than the FCSC. Canada,
for example, is unwilling to cooperate with the embargo and
has amended its legislation to nullify Helms-Burton's effects in
Canada. 7 Therefore, it appears unlikely that U.S. nationals
will obtain compensation for their property under Helms-Bur-
ton. In addition, President Clinton, due mainly to international
resentment over Helms-Burton, has repeatedly stayed the six-
teen billion dollars worth of lawsuits brought by U.S. nationals
against foreign nationals under Title III of Helms-Burton. 2"
As a result, the U.S. government itself is further preventing
aggrieved U.S. nationals from obtaining compensation. Finally,
Cuba, and not foreign investors, should pay compensation for
confiscated U.S. property. International law requires that the
expropriating country provide compensation to foreign nation-
234. U.S. nationals' expropriation claims are based on principles of internation-
al law which recognize a state's (country's) sovereign right to expropriate the as-
sets of foreign nationals within the state's own territory;, however, the expropriat-
ing state must simultaneously provide "adequate, effective and prompt" compensa-
tion to the aliens whose property has been expropriated. See Travieso-Diaz, supra
note 46, at 664 (1996) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1968)).
235. Cuba has not compensated any of the FCSC claimants to date. See
Ratchik, supra note 43, at 347.
236. Clagett, supra note 196, at 436.
237. See discussion supra Part WV.A.
238. See Morton & Geddes, supra note 14.
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als whose property it has confiscated within its territory; 9
therefore, Cuba (the expropriating country), and not the for-
eign investors, should be liable to the United States." °
The United States may also argue that Cuba has violated
international law by confiscating the property of its own citi-
zens. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes the
right of every individual to own property and not be arbitrarily
deprived of it." Because the Cuban government deprived
Cuban citizens of their property, Cuba is in violation of inter-
national law. However, should the United States be the leader
in obtaining compensation for aggrieved Cuban nationals? 2
Canada and Mexico may argue that the United States may not
obtain compensation for Cuban nationals by operation of
Helms-Burton and even if the United States had the authority
to obtain compensation, it must do so by holding the Cuban
government liable because Cuba is the confiscator.
3. Illegal Confiscations May not Pass Effective Title to
Property
Finally, the United States may argue that "traffickers," as
defined under Helms-Burton, neither hold effective nor inter-
nationally recognizable title to confiscated U.S. property in
Cuba.' Illegally confiscated property under international
law should be treated as if having been stolen; the rightful
owner retains title while the so-called "possessor of 'hot
products'" who knows of the products' origin may also be liable
for damages to the rightful owner.' According to this view,
239. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 46, at 664.
240. Brice M. Clagett, an attorney advising clients concerning Title III lawsuit
provision of Helms-Burton, notes that the payment of full monetary compensation
to all claimants to confiscated property in Cuba will be far beyond Cuba's resourc-
es. See Clagett, supra note 196, at 434. Hence, this suggests why the United
States is going after third countries in order to obtain the compensation rather
than looking to Cuba.
241. See id. at 438.
242. This note will not discuss whether or not the United States can be the
leader in obtaining compensation for Cuban nationals who lost property to the
Cuban government. The question is merely posed in response to Brice M. Clagett
who asserts that the United States should be a leader in pressing acceptance for
the view that a country may not confiscate its citizens' property without compen-
sation. Id. at 439.
243. See id. at 438.
244. F.A. MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 126, 186 (1990).
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investors from countries like Canada or Mexico, who invest in
confiscated U.S. property, are "possessors of 'hot products," are
aware of the origin (i.e., ownership) of the stolen property, and
are liable to U.S. nationals who are the rightful owners.
Canada and Mexico, however, may argue that confiscation
of property does not necessarily mean theft of the property.
Sovereign countries may lawfully confiscate foreign-owned
property if they, among other requirements, provide compensa-
tion to the aggrieved property owners." 5 Cuba's confiscation
of American property is not necessarily theft, but an unlawful
confiscation under international law because the confiscation
was not accompanied by adequate compensation. Therefore,
Cuba (the confiscator) must provide the compensation, not
Canadian and Mexican investors.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the United States has arguments with which to
counter assertions that Helms-Burton violates its obligations
under NAFTA and international law, its principle trading
partners have the stronger arguments. Moreover, irrespective
of whether Helms-Burton violates international law, the fact
remains that many U.S. trading partners, especially Canada,
have indicated an unwillingness to cooperate with a tightened
embargo against Cuba and are threatening to take retaliatory
measures. The worst retaliatory measure the United States
may confront is total noncompliance. If the United States can-
not successfully obtain international support, then Fidel Castro
will continue to obtain the foreign investments he needs to
strengthen his government.
The United States may argue that foreign investors in
Cuba are only concerned with financial profits and are oblivi-
ous to the consequences of their investments (the upkeep of
Fidel Castro). However, blinded investments of this sort have
gone on for centuries. For example, the United States may be
deemed to have been concerned only with profits when it blind-
ly continued to trade with China despite China's continuing
human rights violations. 6 Despite these human rights viola-
245. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 46, at 664.
246. See KRINSKY & GOLOVE, supra note 49, at 156 (commenting on the dispa-
rate treatment by the United States with respect to Cuba and other countries
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tions, the United States never resorted to an extreme isolation-
ist policy against China similar to the embargo implemented
against Cuba. 7
The solution to ridding Cuba of Fidel Castro lies not in
penalizing its trading partners, but in gaining cooperation
amongst the global community."4  Coercive policies like
Helms-Burton only pave the way for the creation of customary
principles of international law which would make it legal for
more powerful and influential countries to force less powerful,
and less influential, countries to cooperate with controversial
economic measures. A large, powerful and developed country
like the United States may lead other countries to believe that
an unjustified extraterritorial measure like Helms-Burton is
permissible and legal under international law.
The United States would be likely to deem a foreign coun-
terpart to Helms-Burton reprehensible if countries like Canada
or Mexico adopt similar extraterritorial legislation having a
negative impact upon its investment practices, and upon the
benefits accorded to it under NAFTA. As a result, the United
States should seek noncoercive means of gaining cooperation
amongst the international community for its embargo against
Cuba. For instance, the United States can adopt a treaty with
its trading partners which would discontinue trade with Cuba
or perhaps limit it. A greater emphasis on the vast human
which it considers equally undemocratic and repressive, such as China).
247. A primary reason given for the strong U.S. economic measures against
Cuba, and not against China, is the close geographical proximity of Cuba to the
United States. See id. at 159.
248. It is inappropriate for the United States "to burden the future of a new
world economic order with attempts to impose U.S. extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion . . . . The U.S. government should not contribute to world economic disorder
at a moment when constructive cooperation is especially important." Jorge I.
Dominguez, Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, April 2, 1992, reprinted in KRINSKY & GOLOVE, supra note 49, at
176 (emphasis added). Dominguez added that "the U.S. economy will be greatly
advanced through [NAFTA] ... [and that] the injection of the Cuban question as
an obstacle to the realization of such a strategic vision seems ill advised." Id.
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rights violations taking place under the auspices of the Cuban
government 9 will provide more incentives for foreign coun-
tries to terminate investment relations with Castro's regime.
In the end, using a carrot rather than a stick is the best way
for the United States to gain the cooperation of a global com-
munity of sovereign states.
Antonella Troia
249. See generally Jones, supra note 69.
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